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1. Introduction
A recent strand in economic theory concerns non-exponential time preferences as a
source of dynamic inconsistency in intertemporal decision making.1 Such dynamic de-
cision problems are usually viewed as a sequential game between the decision maker’s
diﬀerent selves.2 A decision rule then takes the form of a strategy proﬁle between
these selves. In the absence of precommitment possibilities, a “consistent plan” for
the decision maker is a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game. We follow this ap-
proach. Moreover, the mentioned studies assume certain parametric representations
of quasi-exponential discount functions which approximate the hyperbolic functions
identiﬁed in experimental psychology.3 As compared with exponential functions, all
these functions have decreasing, rather than constant, discount rates - that is, they
exhibit relatively more patience in the distant future than in the near future. It
hence seems desirable to establish results for all discount functions with this qualita-
tive property, which we will call weakly increasing patience. This is the route followed
here.
It is well-known that inﬁnitely repeated games between patient players have a
very large set of subgame perfect equilibria - with outcomes spanning all feasible and
individually strictly rational outcomes. This is true even when the stage game has
a unique Nash equilibrium and hence every ﬁnite repetition has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Under what conditions can such lack of (lower hemi-) continuity
of the solution correspondence at inﬁnity arise in games between diﬀerent selves
without precommitment possibilities? I ts h o u l db en o t e dt h a tw h i l et h ee ﬀect is
similar to that of the Folk theorem, the reason is diﬀerent. The key mechanism
behind the Folk theorem is credible punishments among players who can choose
whole strategies, that is, who can precommit to future actions. By contrast, the key
mechanism here is the lack of such precommitment possibilities.
Examples of inﬁnite-horizon decision problems with multiple, even inﬁnitely many,
subgame perfect equilibria have been given by Asilis et al (1991), Laibson (1994),
Kocherlakota (1996) and Asheim (1997). These authors view this multiplicity and
the ensuing indeterminacy of the outcome as a pathology that asks for remedy. They
have therefore suggested reﬁnements of the subgame perfection criterion for such
classes of games.4 The main point of the present study is not to take a position
1See, for example, Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Laibson and
Harris (2001).
2See references in the preceding footnote, and also Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968), Phelps and Pollak
(1968), Peleg and Yaari (1973), Elster (1979), Goldman (1980), Asheim (1997) and Bernheim et al.
(1999).
3See, for example, Mazur (1981), Herrnstein (1987) and Ainslie (1992).
4Laibson (1994) requires that a certain set of continuation payoﬀs be bounded, while AsheimUniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 3
for or against those or other reﬁnements. Instead, our goal is to identify a class of
dynamic decision problems in which there is no issue of multiplicity to begin with,
that is, a class of decision problems, each of which has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome. More exactly, we provide a suﬃcient condition for inﬁnitely
repeated decision problems (technically speaking, programs) to have a unique such
solution.
Consider a decision maker who repeatedly, over an inﬁnite sequence of discrete
time periods t, faces the same decision problem over and over, namely to choose some
action xt from a given set X, the same in all periods. The decision maker is presumed
to have stationary and additively separable time preferences represented by a sum of
discounted instantaneous utilities (or period payoﬀs). The condition is two-fold:
(A) Lower bound: the set of feasible instantaneous utility levels should be
bounded from below,
and
(B) Weakly increasing patience: The ratio between the discount factors
attached to periods t +1a n dt should be non-decreasing in t.
In other words, there should be a lower bound on how much damage the decision
maker can cause him- or herself in a period, and the decision maker’s patience should
not be greater concerning events in the near future than concerning events in the
distant future. Condition A is met in many, if not most, of the decision problems an-
alyzed in the economics literature. Laibson (1994) notes that without this condition,
any feasible path, in a certain class of dynamic decision problems, is subgame per-
fect. Condition B is met under traditional exponential discounting as well as under
quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting. This condition has also turned out to
be useful for another, related, purpose, see Saez-Marti and Weibull (2002).
We proceed by ﬁrst, in Section 2, giving three examples in order to high-light
the multiplicity issue and to provide a key to the basic logic behind the subsequent
analysis. The ﬁrst two examples are close in spirit to those in Laibson (1994), although
his setting is slightly diﬀerent, and our third example is close in spirit to Example 2 in
Asheim (1997).5 Section 3 provides formal deﬁnitions and establishes the uniqueness
result.
(1997) requires that the strategy proﬁle be immune to future favorable revisions.
5According to Ashiem (1997), his example is in turn inspired by an example in an unpublished
manuscript by Asislis et al. (1991).Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 4
2. Examples
2.1. Cobb-Douglas preferences. Assume that the decision maker in each pe-






λt ∀τ ∈ N,
where xτ+t is consumption in period τ + t, and all parameters λt are non-negative
and add up to 1, with at least λ0 and λ1 positive.6
First, suppose that the good is non-storable and that the decision maker faces the
same compact set of alternatives in each period: xt ∈ X =[ 0 ,1] for all t.A t ﬁrst
sight, the decision problem may seem trivial: choose xt = 1 in every period. Indeed,
this is a subgame perfect equilibrium proﬁle. For if future consumption levels are
positive and independent of current consumption, then it is a best reply to choose
maximal consumption in the current period. However, there are inﬁnitely many sub-
game perfect equilibria, and the resulting utility levels span the whole range [0,1] of
possible values. For example, to consume 0 in each period, irrespective of history,
is clearly subgame perfect. For if the decision maker expects to consume nothing
in some future period, then he or she is indiﬀerent as to current consumption, and
can thus just as well consume nothing in the current period too.7 Moreover, for any
positive consumption level x = a>0i nX, the following stationary strategy proﬁle
is subgame perfect: consume a if consumption in all earlier periods was a,o t h e r w i s e
consume 0. To see that this indeed is subgame perfect, it suﬃces to verify two con-
ditions: deviations from the “norm” a should be suﬃciently punished, and neglect of
punishment of deviations from the norm should be suﬃciently punished. The tempta-
tion to consume more than a in the current period, if a was consumed in all preceding
periods, just results in an expected total utility of zero, since then zero consumption
is expected in the next period. Second, if some preceding consumption level diﬀered
from a, then current consumption does not matter, since zero consumption is anyhow
expected in the next period.
Secondly, suppose instead that the good is storable and that the set of alternative
consumption streams has to meet a life-time budget constraint. More exactly, sup-
pose that consumption has to be non-negative in all periods t,a n ds u mu pt os o m e
given positive number, which we normalize to unity:
P∞
t=0 xt ≤ 1. If the consumer in
6For example, these weights may decline exponentially over time; λt =( 1− δ)δt for some δ ∈
(0,1).
7Note, however, that this strategy is weakly dominated.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 5
the initial period could pre-commit to a consumption proﬁle, then he or she would ev-
idently choose xt = λt for all periods t - this choice would maximize U0 (¯ x). However,
this dynamic decision problem has inﬁnitely many subgame perfect equilibria as well.
First, to consume 0 in each period, irrespective of history, is clearly subgame perfect.
For if the decision maker expects zero consumption in the next period, then he or
she is again indiﬀerent as to current consumption. Moreover, for any stream ¯ x of
positive consumption levels xt, summing up to 1 or less, the following strategy proﬁle
is subgame perfect: consume xt in each period t if consumption in all earlier periods
followed ¯ x, otherwise consume 0. Again the temptation to consume more than xt in
period t, if the prescribed stream ¯ x was followed so far, results in an expected total
utility of zero and likewise if in some preceding period consumption deviated from ¯ x.
In this example, there is no real incentive to punish: the punisher is indiﬀerent
between punishing and not punishing. Moreover, while most models of intertemporal
decision making in economics are additively separable, the present model is not. We
may, of course, just take the logarithm of the present utility function Uτ in order
to obtain additive separability. However, while in the present example the lower
bound on consumption, zero, belongs to the domain of the subutility function, this is
not the case after the logarithmic transformation. Though seemingly insubstantial,
this transformation does matter, since then the threat of zero consumption as a
punishment is no longer available. We study this case in the following example,
where there is a strict incentive to punish.
2.2. Exponential time preferences. In this example, the decision maker has
additively separable and exponential time preferences. Suppose, moreover, that the
set of available actions is the same in each period, and that this set contains a unique
point which maximizes instantaneous utility. Despite this “classical” setting of this
example, all feasible utility levels are still consistent with subgame perfection.
More speciﬁcally, let the set of available actions in each period be X =( 0 ,1], and
let the instantaneous utility of consumption be logarithmic, u(x)=l o gx. Hence, the
instantaneous utility is maximized by the choice x∗ = 1, and the associated utility
level is u(x∗) = 0. Suppose that the decision-maker’s preferences in each period τ
are represented by the following utility function:





f o rs o m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rδ ∈ (0,1).8
8Hence, the current utility function is the logarithm of that in the preceding example, with
λt =( 1− δ)δt.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 6
We argue that this game has inﬁnitely many subgame perfect equilibria, and that
the associated set of equilibrium utility levels for the decision maker, as viewed from
the initial period, is the whole range u(X)=( −∞,0] of possible utility levels. The
strategy proﬁles which we construct below all have the feature that player 0 (”self
0”) chooses a suboptimal action in terms of the one-shot decision problem, in the
fear of otherwise invoking a “punishment” from the next player (self). The next
player indeed does have an incentive to punish defections, since lack of punishment
is expected to be punished etc., in an inﬁnite hierarchy of ever harsher punishments.
More precisely, for any a ∈ (0,1), we consider a certain strategy proﬁle which
induces the outcome (a,1,1,1,..), that is, the suboptimal action a followed by an
inﬁnite strings of the optimal action 1, resulting in suboptimal utility to the decision
maker, U0 (¯ x)=l o g a<0. Let player 0 choose x0 = a. In this case, player 1
chooses x1 = x∗ = 1, otherwise he chooses x1 = a2 <a . Likewise, player 2 chooses
x2 = x∗ = 1 if the preceding “history” is h =( a,1) or if it is h0 =( x0,x 1)w i t h
x1 = a2. Otherwise, player 2 chooses x2 = a4. More generally, for any integer τ ≥ 1,
player τ chooses 1 if player τ−1 punished when she should, otherwise player τ chooses
ap(τ),w h e r ep(τ)=2 τ. Formally, the choice of player τ depends on the identity iτ
of the player who last deviated. This identity is deﬁned recursively as follows: set
i0 = −1. For τ ≥ 1, set iτ = τ − 1 (the preceding player), if iτ−1 = τ − 2( i ft h e
preceding player should punish), and xτ−1 6= ap(τ−1) (but did not punish), otherwise,
set iτ = iτ−1 (the player who last deviated before the preceding player). The strategy
of player τ, for any τ ≥ 0, is to choose xτ = ap(τ) if iτ = τ − 1a n dxτ =1o t h e r w i s e .
Is this strategy proﬁle subgame perfect? The answer is aﬃrmative if δ > 1/2.9
To see this, consider any player τ ≥ 0. If τ > 0a n ds h ed e v i a t e sw h e niτ < τ −1, i.e.
when she should play 1, she can only loose. Secondly, if she deviates when iτ = τ −1,
i.e. when she should play ap(τ),t h e ns h eo b t a i n s
0+δp(τ +1 )l o ga +0+0+...
instead of
p(τ)loga +0+0+...
The former payoﬀ falls short of the latter iﬀ 2δloga<loga, or, equivalently (since
a<1), iﬀ δ > 1/2. Consequently, for any a ∈ (0,1), the given strategy proﬁle is
subgame perfect.
9Our claim that the sequence (a,1,1,...,) as a a subgame perfect outcome is in fact valid as soon
as δ > 0. If δ ≤ 1/2, punishments should be more stringent.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 7
2.3. Non-exponential time preferences. In the preceding example, punish-
ers had a strict incentive to punish, but the range of instantaneous utilities was
unbounded from below, thus allowing for an inﬁnite hierarchy of ever harsher punish-
ments. The ﬁrst example had a lower bound on instantaneous utilities, but punishers
had only a weak incentive to punish. In the following example, the range of in-
stantaneous utilities is bounded from below and punishers have a strict incentive to
punish.
Suppose X =[ 0 ,1] and let u(x)=x.H e n c e ,x∗ =1a n du(x∗) = 1. The utility
functions Uτ are deﬁned as Cobb-Douglas functions of, on the one hand, the minimal
payoﬀ in the nearest T +1p e r i o d s( f o ra n yT ≥ 1), and, on the other hand, the















∀τ ∈ N,( 1 )
for some δ,λ ∈ (0,1), where λ is the weight attached to the minimal-payoﬀ consider-
ation.
We construct a strategy proﬁle much along the lines of the preceding example.
Player 0 again chooses a suboptimal action, in terms of the one-shot decision problem,
for fear of triggering a punishment from the next player, who in turn carries out the
punishment for fear of otherwise being punished, etc. in an inﬁnite hierarchy of
punishments. More precisely, we shall again prove that, for any action a ∈ (0,1),
the outcome ¯ x =( a,1,1,...) is subgame perfect. The resulting payoﬀ to player 0, the
ex ante expected utility to the decision maker, is accordingly aλ [(1 − δ)a + δ]
1−λ,a
number below one that can be brought arbitrarily close to zero by a suitable choice
of a.
One strategy proﬁle which induces this outcome is the following. Player 0 chooses
x0 = a ∈ (0,1). In this case, player 1 chooses x1 = x∗ = 1, otherwise he chooses
x1 = a/2. Likewise, player 2 chooses x2 = x∗ = 1 if the preceding history is h =( a,1)
or if it is h0 =( x0,x 1)w i t hx1 = a/2. Otherwise, she chooses x2 = a/4. More
generally, for any integer τ ≥ 1, player τ chooses 1 if player τ − 1 punished when
she should, otherwise player τ chooses a/p(τ), where again p(τ)=2 τ.F o r m a l l y ,t h e
choice of player τ again depends on the identity iτ of the player who last deviated,
where i0 = −1, and, for τ ≥ 1, iτ = τ −1i fiτ−1 = τ −2a n dxτ−1 6= a/p(τ − 1), and
otherwise iτ = iτ−1 The strategy of player τ, for any τ ≥ 0, is to choose xτ = a/p(τ)
if iτ = τ − 1, and xτ =1o t h e r w i s e .
Is this strategy proﬁle subgame perfect? It suﬃces to show that U0 assigns a higher
10T h ea n a l y s i si sv a l i da l s oi fT =+ ∞.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 8
value to the stream ¯ x =( a0,1,1,1,....) than to the stream ¯ y =( 1 ,a 0/2,1,1,...), for
all a0 ∈ (0,1). We analyze the special case λ =1 /2.11 Then
U0 (¯ x) >U 0 (¯ y) ⇔ a
0 [(1 − δ)a




















1 − δ + δ
2¢
,
an inequality which holds for all a0 ∈ (0,1) if δ2 − 3δ +1≤ 0. The latter inequality
holds for all δ ≥ 1/2.12 In sum: The studied strategy proﬁle is subgame perfect for
all a ∈ (0,1) and all δ,λ ≥ 1/2 . By varying the initial action a,t h eex ante utility
to the decision maker can be any number in the interval (0,1).
3. Infinitely repeated decision problems
Having considered examples of non-uniqueness, we now address the task of identify-
ing suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems with
discounting.13 More exactly, consider a decision maker who repeatedly faces the same
decision problem, namely to choose an action xt from some ﬁxed set X,i ne a c hp e r i o d
t =0 ,1,2,...A noutcome ¯ x is an inﬁnite sequence of actions xt ∈ X,a n dw ew r i t e
¯ x =( x0,x 1,...) ∈ X∞. The decision maker in each period τ has preferences which





for some function u : X → R and some non-increasing, positive and summable
sequence f =( ft)t∈N.14 We interpret u(x)a st h einstantaneous (sub)utility from
consuming x ∈ X, f as the discount function,a n dft > 0a st h ediscount weight
attached to the instantaneous utility from consumption t periods later. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the sum of the discount weights to one:
P
t ft =1 .
T h ea n a l y s i si sf o c u s e do nt h ec a s ew h e nt h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rc a n n o tp r e c o m m i tt o
actions in future periods. Following the literature mentioned in the introduction, we
accordingly model the decision maker in each period τ as a separate player, “self τ.”
11It is easily veriﬁed that the inequalities below in fact hold for all λ ≥ 1/2.







13In particular, the second case considered in the ﬁrst example - that of a life-time budget con-
straint - is excluded.
14We use R to denote the reals, R+ the non-negative reals, and N the non-negative integers.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 9
Any “decision rule” of self τ takes the form of a pure behavior strategy sτ : Hτ → X,
where Hτ is the set of “histories” up to, but not including, period τ.M o r ee x a c t l y ,
Hτ = Xτ for τ positive and H0 = {h0},w h e r eh0 is the “null history” in period
zero.15 The set of players is thus N. A sequence s =( sτ)τ∈N of behavior strategies
will be called a strategy proﬁle, and the set of pure strategy proﬁles is denoted S.
Clearly every pure strategy proﬁle generates a unique outcome ¯ x.T h ep a y o ﬀ to each
player τ ∈ N is the utility Uτ (¯ x) to the decision maker in that period. Player τ’s
payoﬀ function πτ : S → R is thus deﬁned by πτ (s)=Uτ (¯ x), where ¯ x is the outcome
induced by s.T h e ex-ante utility to the decision maker is deﬁned as U0 (¯ x). This
deﬁnes an inﬁnite extensive-form game of perfect and complete information, to be
denoted Γ. The solution concept we will use is that of subgame perfection; each
player’s strategy is required to be a best reply to the others’ strategies, given any
history leading up to the player’s decision period.
Let v∗ be the (possibly inﬁnite) least upper bound on the decision maker’s in-
stantaneous (as well as total) utility, v∗ =s u p x∈X u(x), and let X∗ be the (possibly
empty) set where u attains its supremum value:
X
∗ = {x ∈ X : u(x)=v
∗} .( 3 )
In standard microeconomic settings, X is compact and u continuous, implying that
u attains its supremum value, or formally, X∗ 6= ∅. This case is covered by, but not
presumed, in the subsequent analysis.
Had the decision problem been repeated a ﬁnite number of times, then the set of
subgame perfect equilibria is self-evident: (a) if X∗ = ∅, then no equilibrium exists,
(b) if X∗ contains exactly one action, x∗, then the unique equilibrium is to choose x∗
in each period, irrespective of history, resulting in utility v∗ to the decision maker,
and (c), if X∗ contains more than one action, then every equilibrium prescribes some
action from X∗ in each period, where the choice may be conditioned on the date
(τ) and/or on the history (hτ), again resulting in utility v∗ to the decision-maker.
However, as the initial examples show, uniqueness may be lost if the decision problem
is repeated inﬁnitely many times.
It is natural to allow for the possibility that a player τ randomizes when choosing
an action. Hence, while the main analysis will be restricted to pure behavioral strate-
gies, as outlined above, we will also show how the analysis can be extended to general
behavior strategies στ : Hτ → ∆(X), where ∆(X) is the set of probability distribu-
tions over X, and where all randomizations are statistically independent. Each such
general behavior strategy proﬁle σ induces a unique probability distribution over the
set of outcomes, see Remark 2 below.
15See remarks below concerning randomized behavior strategies.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 10
3.1. Uniqueness. We have seen that uniqueness may fail if the range of possible
payoﬀs in the one-shot decision problem is not bounded from below, or if time prefer-
ences diﬀer much from exponential discounting. We here establish uniqueness under
the two-fold condition (A)-(B) mentioned in the introduction, namely, that the payoﬀ
range be bounded from below, and that the discount function exhibit weakly increas-
ing patience. More precisely, the set u(X) ⊂ R should have a lower bound, and the
sequence gt = ft+1/ft should be non-decreasing. This last condition, introduced by
Saez-Marti and Weibull (2002), is clearly met by standard exponential discounting,
in which case gt = δ for all t. The condition is also met by the quasi-exponential dis-
count functions used in the macroeconomics literature (see, for example, Phelps and
Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999), and Laibson
and Harris (2001)): then g0 = βδ ≤ gt = δ for all positive t,w h e r eβ,δ ∈ (0,1). The
condition is also met by the hyperbolic discount functions used in the psychology
literature (see, for example, Mazur (1981), Herrnstein (1987) and Ainslie (1992)).
There, gt =[ ( 1+at)/(1 + a + at)]
b,f o ra,b > 0.
The following result establishes that the uniqueness properties of the static deci-
sion program are inherited by the inﬁnitely repeated program, under the mentioned
two conditions.
Proposition 1. Suppose u(X) is bounded from below and (gt) is non-decreasing.
If X∗ is a singleton set, then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, every player chooses x∗ ∈ X∗, irrespective of history. If X∗ 6= ∅,
then every player chooses some action from X∗ in each period, in all subgame perfect
equilibria.
Proof: We focus on pure strategy proﬁles. The case of general strategy proﬁles is
dealt with in Remark 2 below. Moreover, we focus on the case X∗ = {x∗}.Am i n o r
and straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof establishes the claim for the case when
X∗ is non-empty but not necessarily a singleton.
Suppose, thus, that X∗ = {x∗},a n dl e ts∗ assign xτ = x∗ to all periods τ,
irrespective of history. Evidently s∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), and
πτ(s∗)=v∗ for all τ. This establishes existence. For uniqueness, suppose there is a
pure SPE s 6= s∗. Then there is a period τ a n da nh i s t o r yhτ ∈ Hτ at which player
τ chooses xτ 6= x∗. Consider the subgame Γ0 which begins at the node in the game
tree which corresponds to this hτ.L e t s0 be the proﬁle induced by s in Γ0.B y t h e
choice of hτ,t h i sp r o ﬁle has player τ choose a suboptimal action in Γ0: πτ(s0) <v ∗.
Since all subgames are “isomorphic” to the original game Γ, by relabeling of players
and periods, we may view s0 as a proﬁle of the original game Γ. Hence, there exists
a subgame perfect proﬁle s0 in Γ such that π0(s0) <v ∗.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 11
Suppose furthermore that, given any such suboptimal SPE s0, there exists an









If this is true, then it follows, by using (4) repetitively, that there are SPE’s s00 for
which the payoﬀ diﬀerence v∗ − π0(s00) is arbitrarily large (since 0 <f 0 < 1). Thus,
u(X) is then not bounded from below, contradicting the hypothesis in the proposition.
Hence, it suﬃces to prove that, given any SPE s0, there exists a SPE s00 satisfying
(4). We deal ﬁrst with the easier case of exponential discounting.
Exponential discounting (gt constant): Deﬁne V1 : X∞ → R by shifting back
discount factors by one period, V1(¯ x)=
P∞
t=0 ft+1u(xt). Thus, writing ¯ x =( x0, ¯ y),
with ¯ y ∈ X∞,w eh a v eU0(¯ x)=f0u(x0)+V1(¯ y). Under exponential discounting,
V1(¯ y)=( 1− f0)U0(¯ y). Let s0 be an arbitrary SPE and let s00 be the proﬁle induced
by s0 in the subgame Γ00 starting in period 1, after player 0 has chosen x∗.S i n c es0 is
a SPE, so is s00,a n d ,t h ef a c tt h a ts0 is a SPE implies16
π0(s
0) ≥ f0v
∗ +( 1− f0)π0(s
00), (5)
an inequality which is equivalent to (4).
Generalized hyperbolic discounting (gt non-decreasing): Deﬁne s00 as in the previous




where ¯ y =¯ x1 =( x1,x 2,...) is the outcome induced by s00. Recall that V1(¯ y)i sh o w
player 0 evaluates the sequence of decisions taken in periods 1,2,....
We re-normalize the discount factors that appear in V1 by setting β =
P∞
t=1 ft =
1 − f0, and writing e U1(¯ x)=V1(¯ x)/β for all ¯ x ∈ X∞.F o r x ∈ X∞ and τ > 0,
let ¯ xτ =( xτ,x τ+1,...) ∈ X∞ be the outcome obtained from the choices in periods
τ,τ +1,...W eﬁrst prove that e U1(¯ x1) is a convex combination of {U0(¯ xτ):τ ≥ 1}.I n
other words, the re-normalized utility to self 0 from the choices made by his future
selves is a convex combination of their utilities (see also Proposition 2 in Saez-Marti
and Weibull (2002)). This is a consequence of (gt) being non-decreasing.
To see this, set αt = ft+1/β,s ot h a te U1(¯ x1)=
P∞
t=0 αtu(xt+1). Note that U0(¯ xτ)= P∞
t=0 ftu(xt+τ). Hence it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd nonnegative numbers (λt)t∈N which sum
16As in the previous paragraph, we may also view s0 as a proﬁle in the original game Γ.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 12
to 1, such that αt =
Pt
k=0 λkft−k for each t ∈ N,t h eλt being the coeﬃcients in the
convex combination. This condition on (λt) takes the form of a inﬁnite triangular
linear system. Since f0 6= 0, this system has a unique solution. By induction, it can
be shown that λt ≥ 0 for all t. Assume λ0,...,λt−1 ≥ 0. To prove that λt ≥ 0, one






















Since the denominators on both sides of (8) coincide, (7) follows. The fact that the
sequence (λt)t∈N sums up to one is a consequence of the fact that both sequences



















Having proved that the utility to self 0 is a convex combination of the utilities to
his future selves, we note that, by (6),
π0(s) ≥ f0v
∗ +( 1− f0)e U1(¯ x
1).
It follows from the above that e U1(¯ x1) ≥ U0(¯ xτ)f o rs o m eτ ≥ 1. Therefore,
v






Let ˆ sτ denote the proﬁle induced by s00 in the subgame starting at stage τ, after
the history hτ =( x1,...,xτ−1), the path induced by s00 up to period τ. The proﬁle
ˆ sτ, viewed as a proﬁle in the full game Γ, is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Since
π0(ˆ sτ)=U0(¯ xτ), this establishes the inequality (4), and thus the claimed uniqueness.
End of proof.
Remark 1: If X∗ = ∅ and u(X) is bounded from below, the dynamic game
has no SPE. This can be proved by noting that if s would be a subgame perfectUniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 13
equilibrium strategy, then it would have to satisfy π0(s) <v ∗. A contradiction can
then be obtained along the same lines as in the above proof.
Remark 2: Randomized behavior strategies can be ruled out in the case when
X∗ is a singleton. In order to establish this claim, the above proof may be amended
as follows. Given a general behavior-strategy proﬁle σ,l e tPσ denote the induced
probability distribution over outcomes ¯ x ∈ X∞, and denote by Eσ the expectation
w.r.t. Pσ. Arguing as in the proof for pure-strategy proﬁles, the existence of a SPE
σ =( στ)τ∈N which diﬀers from s∗ implies the existence of a SPE σ0 =( σ0
τ)τ∈N such
that π0(σ0) <v ∗ (σ0 is obtained as the proﬁle induced by σ in a speciﬁc subgame).
Since player 0 then makes suboptimal choices x ∈ X with positive probability, there













Next, we use the notation of the above proof: given an outcome x =( xt)t∈N ∈ X∞ and
any τ ≥ 1, we let xτ be the outcome (xτ,x τ+1,...). Since e U1(x1)=
P∞
t=0 λtU0(xt+1),















Letting Hτ denote the information σ−algebra of player τ over outcomes, the preceding





















≥ Eσ00 [U0(xτ)|Hτ]w i t h
positive Pσ00-probability. Reinterpreting the right-hand side of this inequality, there









By subgame perfection, also b στ is subgame perfect. Plugging the last inequality into
(9) yields
v







which is the exact analog of (4). The contradiction follows, just as in the proof for
pure proﬁles.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 14
References
[1] Ainslie G. W. (1992): Picoeconomics, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge
UK).
[2] Asheim G. (1997): “Individual and collective time-consistency”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 64, 427-443.
[3] Asilis C., Kahn C. and D. Mookherjee (1991): “A uniﬁed approach to proof
equilibria”, mimeo. University of Illinois.
[4] Bernheim D., D. Ray and S. Yeltekin (1999): “Self-control, saving, and the low
asset trap”, mimeo.
[5] Elster J. (1979): Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, UK).
[6] Goldman S. (1980): “Consistent plans”, Review of Economic Studies 47, 533-537.
[7] Herrnstein R. (1981): “Self control and response strength”, in Quantiﬁcation of
Steady-State Operant Behavior, Christopher et al (eds.), North-Holland (Ams-
terdam).
[8] Kocherlakota N. R. (1996): “Reconsideration-proofness: A reﬁnement for
inﬁnite-horizon time inconsistency”, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 33- 54.
[9] Laibson D. (1994): “Self-control and saving”, mimeo. Harvard University.
[10] Laibson D. and C. Harris (2001): “Dynamic choices of hyperbolic consumers”,
Econometrica 69, 935-957.
[11] Mazur J.E. (1987): “An adjustment procedure for studying delayed reinforce-
ment”, in The Eﬀect of Delay and Intervening Events on Reinforcement Value,
J. Commons et al (eds.), Erlbaum (NJ).
[12] Phelps E. and R. A. Pollak: “On second-best national saving and game-
equilibrium growth”, Review of Economic Studies 35, 185-199.
[13] Peleg B. and M. E. Yaari (1973): “On the existence of a consistent course of
action when tastes are changing”, Review of Economic Studies 40, 391-401.
[14] Pollak R. A. (1968): “Consistent planning”, Review of Economic Studies 35,
201-208.Uniqueness in inﬁnitely repeated decision problems 15
[15] Saez-Marti M. and J. Weibull (2002): “Discounting and future selves”, IUI WP
575.
[16] Strotz R. H. (1956): “Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximiza-
tion”, Review of Economic Studies 23, 165-180.